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1. Kant’s aims in the deduction 
A traditional and still prevalent interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason’s 
transcendental deduction of the categories attributes to Kant the aim of refuting skepticism. 
Presumably, the arguments in the deduction are meant to justify the application of the categories 
to the objects of experience in a way that answers the skeptic’s challenge. 
Various skeptics have seemed to be Kant’s target. For the sake of this discussion, I 
consider only skeptical empiricists. Such figures, among whom Kant counted Hume, hold that all 
concepts derive from experience. And that leads them to doubt or deny that any concept not 
derived from experience could validly apply to objects.  1
That the deduction is meant to refute skeptical empiricism can seem to be suggested by 
its apparent argumentative form. Though the two editions’ versions of this argument differ 
substantially, they are both preceded by the same sketch. Here, Kant says: “The objective 
validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests…on the fact that…through them alone does 
experience become possible” (KrV, A 93/B 126).  If it can be shown that the application of the 2
categories to objects is a condition on the possibility of experience, then the argument would 
seem to have overwhelming force. Acceptance of its conclusions would seem to be inevitable, 
since it seems that no one could deny that experience is possible. Presumably, even skeptical 
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empiricists would be compelled to accept the conclusion, and so be forced to give up their 
skepticism about the application of pure concepts, like the categories. 
Over time, this picture has come to look naïve to many. Less charitable readers have 
attributed the naïveté to Kant, arguing that he fails to acheive his aim of refuting the skeptical 
empiricist, because such a figure would resist his premise that the objective validity of the 
categories conditions all possible experience.  More charitable readers have attributed the naïveté 3
to the picture, acknowledging that Kant would not expect empiricists to accept the premises, but 
denying that the deduction is meant to refute such figures.  4
Recently, some have called for a reevaluation of the situation in light of a survey of the 
historical figures and texts which influenced Kant’s thought. This has led some to think that Kant 
was right after all to expect the empiricist would accept his premises, and so be refuted.  But 5
others still deny that this was Kant’s aim.  There remains little consensus about whether Kant 6
intends his deduction to refute skeptical empiricism.  7
I think both sides are missing something important here. Both have assumed that the 
deduction can only refute empiricism if the empiricist accepts its premises while believing that 
empiricism is true. But that is not how Kant sees things. For Kant sees his deduction as offering 
the skeptical empiricist a way out of her skepticism, even if it deploys premises she would not 
accept while holding fast to her empiricism. This can sound fantastical. But, I argue, Kant is 
reasonable to think this, given his understanding of the sources of skeptical empiricism. 
In the next section, I discuss Kant’s claim that skeptical empiricism is a stagnated stage in 
the development of reason towards critique. In §3, I argue that Kant’s deduction offers the 
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empiricist what she would need to progress—namely, an explanation of the possibility she fails 
to comprehend. In §4, I respond to the worry that the empiricist would fail to be moved by this 
explanation, by showing that Kant thinks that her conviction in empiricism is necessarily 
unstable. The deduction, I conclude, offers a way out of skeptical empiricism, without 
compelling it. 
2. Progress, haste, and despair 
Kant’s first mention of the “sceptic” in the Critique appears within a discussion of the 
historical development of metaphysics from dogmatism towards “critique”—namely, “a tribunal 
which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by 
despotic decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws” (KrV, A ix–xii). 
Skeptics are here described as reacting against the innumerable and unruly disputes between 
warring dogmatists. In this regard, the skeptics, like Kant, acknowledge and criticize the 
lawlessness of the dogmatists’ reigns. This represents a growth in maturity, but one that stagnates 
in a “doubt” about the possibility of a lawful metaphysics.  8
Kant seems hostile to the skeptics in this discussion. He says, “Happily they were few in 
number” (KrV, A ix). But elsewhere he sees the skeptic as playing an important role in the 
progress of metaphysics. “The sceptic,” he says, “is thus a taskmaster who constrains the 
dogmatic reasoner to develop a sound critique of the understanding and reason.” In this way, the 
skeptic “prepares the way” to critique (KrV, A 769/B 797). 
The same favorable tone pervades Kant’s discussion of “the most ingenious of all the 
sceptics”: Hume. Kant portrays Hume more as an “acute” ally than an adversary (KrV, A 764/B 
792, A 767/B 795). For example, Hume is seen as “arguing quite consistently” for some of the 
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negative results of critique, like the impossibility of the application of concepts “beyond the 
limits of experience” (KrV, B 127).  9
Hume, and skeptics in general, go awry, Kant thinks, when they take the censure of 
dogmatism too far, and decide that metaphysics has no prospects: “[W]hile rightly denying to the 
understanding what it cannot really supply, they go on to deny it all power of extending itself a 
priori” (KrV, A 767/B 795). Skepticism then arises in “despair as regards satisfaction of reason’s 
most important aim”—namely, answering metaphysical questions (Prol, AA 4: 271). 
Kant’s main criticism of Hume is that he is “overly hasty” in giving up on the possibility 
of metaphysics (Prol, AA 4: 258). He complains that Hume’s verdict on the application of pure 
concepts, and so on the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, is made “in spite of his never 
having tested it as a whole” (KrV, A 767/B 795). 
What did Hume hastily overlook? What “never occurred to Hume,” Kant says, is the 
proper “relation of the understanding to experience”—that is, that “the pure concepts of the 
understanding…[are] not [related] in such a way that they are derived from experience, but that 
experience is derived from them” (Prol, AA 4: 313; KrV, B 127). In other words, Hume failed to 
entertain Kant’s Copernican turn—“the new point of view” which Kant thinks “enables us to 
explain how there can be knowledge a priori” (KrV, B xix). 
Kant’s diagnosis here suggests that an appropriate response to the skeptical empiricist is 
to show her that empiricism is not her last resort. If she is given a way of comprehending the 
possibility that the understanding’s pure concepts make possible the objects of experience, she 
could progress beyond her skepticism and to critique. 
3. The deduction’s explanatory dimension 
I will now argue that a crucial dimension of the deduction is an explanation of just the 
possibility which the skeptical empiricist overlooks. 
 Here, I am setting aside Kant’s practical application of concepts to supersensible objects.9
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In a section entitled “The Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction” (KrV, B 116), 
Kant defines a transcendental deduction as “the explanation of the manner  in which concepts 10
can thus relate a priori to objects” (KrV, A 85/B 117, my italics). 
An “explanation of the manner” in which certain concepts relate a priori to objects can 
sound too unambitious a goal to someone who thinks the deduction is meant to refute certain 
skeptics. I speculate that this is why the definition of a transcendental deduction has not received 
due attention. Yet this definition’s portrayal of the deduction as “explanatory” is by no means 
isolated: In the first edition preface, for example, Kant says the deduction will “expound and 
render intelligible  [the] objective validity” of the categories (KrV, A xvi–xvii, my italics). At 11
the beginning of the first edition’s deduction, Kant says that “the understanding,…as a faculty of 
knowledge that is meant to relate to objects, calls for explanation  in regard to the possibility of 12
such relation” (KrV, A 97, my italics). At its end, Kant says that the goal of “the transcendental 
deduction of the categories [was] to render comprehensible  this relation of understanding…to 13
all objects of experience” (KrV, A 128, my italics). 
Such claims also appear in the Critique’s second edition: In a carefully worded, one-
sentence “outline” of the second edition’s deduction, Kant says, “The deduction is the exposition 
[or exhibition, Darstellung] of the pure concepts of the understanding… as principles of the 
possibility of experience” (KrV, B 168, my italics). The word ‘Darstellung’ evokes setting forth 
something tangible for viewing or surveying, as one does in laying out a blueprint for the 
building of a house. Such an exhibition makes the structure of something clear by the 
arrangement of what it sets forth.  Plausibly, an exhibition of this sort is exactly what is 14
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requested when Kant asks “how,”  not whether, “metaphysics as science” or “synthetic a priori 15
knowledge is possible” (KrV, B 19-22, my emphasis; Prol, AA 4: 276-280). 
A full defense of this interpretation would have to say more about how the content of the 
deduction is supposed to “exhibit” and “render intelligible” the understanding’s a priori relating 
to the objects of experience. This would require a more detailed exploration of the deduction 
than I can provide in a brief paper, and is the subject of future work.  I want instead to focus on 16
the anti-skeptical promises of the deduction on this interpretation. 
4. The instability of skeptical empiricism 
The deduction offers the skeptical empiricist a way out of her skepticism by providing 
her with an explanation of a possibility she overlooked. If she is receptive to this explanation, she 
could come to understand how pure concepts can validly apply to objects, and then give up both 
her skepticism and her empiricism. 
But will she be receptive? An affirmative answer may seem hopelessly naïve, and so 
unattributable to a shrewd thinker like Kant. Kant’s explanation in the deduction is an 
explanation of how concepts apply a priori to the objects of experience. The skeptical empiricist 
denies precisely this application. Why would she even listen to an explanation of what she 
denies? Such an explanation would seem to leave her cold. Kant’s expecting otherwise may seem 
tantamount to expecting a sudden, unexplained conversion. I doubt, however, that this 
interpretation of Kant’s expectations forces us to view him in a poor light. Quite the contrary: 
Kant’s hope reflects a keen understanding of skepticism and its sources. 
Kant’s perhaps most penetrating treatment of skeptical empiricism appears in a rich yet 
seldom discussed passage near the end of his first Critique, entitled “The Impossibility of a 
Sceptical Satisfaction of Pure Reason in its Internal Conflict” (KrV, A 758-769/B 786-797). As 
Kant sees it, the skeptical empiricist who pretends to be satisfied with her empiricism is in bad 
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faith. The desire to acquire synthetic a priori knowledge is a basic and inevitable “natural 
disposition” of human reason (KrV, B 22): We humans are “impetuously driven by an inward 
need to questions such as cannot be answered by empirical employment of reason” (KrV, B 21). 
This implies that the skeptical empiricist, who in Kant’s eyes has given up on answering these 
questions, is necessarily at war with herself. It follows that, in some sense, the skeptical 
empiricist is always ready to give up her skepticism, if the way to acquiring such knowledge 
were to become clear. What Kant offers in his deduction, then, would give her what she really 
yearns for—an illustration of the possibility of the natural enterprise that she prematurely 
abandoned only out of frustration. 
Of course, for Kant’s deduction to inspire this movement, the skeptic would have to 
entertain aspects of Kant’s philosophy that, according to her empiricism, she should resist—for 
example, Kant’s Copernican turn. The skeptic may not always be willing. When she isn’t, Kant 
has a few tactics. He can, for example, push his view that the claims of mathematics are synthetic 
a priori. Even Hume, he thinks, would rather give up his skeptical empiricism than our 
pretensions to mathematical knowledge (KrV, B 4-5, 19-20; Prol, AA 4: 272, 4:260).  I presume, 17
however, that Kant thought these tactics for attracting the skeptic’s interest are ultimately 
inessential. For, according to Kant, a “sceptical satisfaction of pure reason” is “impossible.” The 
skeptic’s dissatisfaction will periodically or eventually creep through the cracks. And while the 
skeptic feels dissatisfied with her position, she may become a more sympathetic listener. 
Why does Kant think that the skeptic can never successfully purge the urge to 
metaphysics? Kant’s answer seems to be that the Humean skeptic has no stable, conclusive 
reason to doubt the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge (including potential metaphysical 
knowledge). Of course, the empiricist tenet that all synthetic knowledge is gained through 
experience would, if known, provide a conclusive reason to give up on metaphysics. But Kant is 
not worried about this possibility. For he thinks that if the tenet is true, then we cannot know it. 
Kant says: 
 It is not clear that Kant is right about this. For a response on behalf of Hume, see (Thielke 2015).17
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Nothing worse could happen to [the development of systems of synthetic a priori knowledge] than that 
someone should make the unexpected discovery that there is and can be no [synthetic] a priori 
knowledge  at all. But there is no danger of this. It would be tantamount to someone’s wanting to prove 18
by reason that there is no reason. … It is an outright contradiction to want to extract necessity from an 
empirical proposition (ex pumice aquam) and to give a judgment, along with necessity, true universality. 
KpV, AA 5: 12 
For Kant, the empiricist’s tenet would have to hold a priori, given its universal scope: 
“experience never confers on its judgments true or strict…universality” (KrV, B 3-4). The tenet 
is also clearly synthetic, since the predicate ‘gained through experience’ is not already contained 
in the concept of synthetic knowledge. So the tenet would be synthetic a priori, and so provide a 
counterexample to itself, if known. 
Kant thinks this shows that the empiricist’s tenet is liable “to be doubted, as being based 
only on facts which are contingent” (KrV, A 767-768/B 795-796). The fact that attempts at 
metaphysical systems have so far failed, or have seemed to, does not conclusively oblige us to 
lose hope. For Kant, no empirical finding could. And so as long as the skeptical empiricist doubts 
the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, she effectively doubts the possibility of knowing 
what her tenet asserts. To be sure, Kant thinks it is epistemically possible that reason could 
determine that some or all metaphysical questions are unanswerable. But reason could only do so 
through self-critique, not through the empiricist’s tenet. 
The result is that nothing locks the skeptical empiricist into her view beyond her despair-
born doubt. That suggests that a skeptical empiricist may, at times, gain some distance from her 
conviction in empiricism. She may then be wrested out of her despair by an explanation that 
satisfyingly “renders intelligible” synthetic a priori knowledge. As I have suggested, Kant’s 
deduction presents a detailed illustration of a possible relationship between concepts and objects 
which he thinks empiricists like Hume have so far failed to entertain. It is reasonable to think, 
then, that Kant’s vivid illustration of this relationship could engage the skeptic’s imagination, and 
get her to comprehend the possibility that she previously did not see. She could then move 
beyond her skepticism with adventurous energies restored. 
 Following Kemp Smith, I translate ‘Erkenntnis’ as ‘knowledge’ in place of Gregor’s ‘cognition.’18
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Here, an objection looms. If what I say is right, why did Kant’s Critique not eradicate 
skeptical empiricism, a view which lives on in many guises today? 
One partial answer is that Kant failed to achieve his goal of shedding light on the 
possibility that the skeptic overlooked, or succeeded only partially without eradicating 
obstructions and obscurities. The deduction is, after all, notoriously difficult. 
Another answer is that certain moods and attitudes can make the skeptics among us 
obstinate and poor listeners. A skeptic may, for instance, find some perverted contentment in her 
despair and so be left cold by opportunities to emerge from it, like the slothful unrequited lover 
who enjoys his dissatisfaction. Again, a skeptic may take pride in her refusal to listen to people 
outside her ‘in’-group, like dissenters proud of flouting the status quo. Such pseudo-satisfactions, 
and the personalities and moods which tend toward them, may postpone the skeptic’s natural 
urge to have metaphysical questions answered. 
Kant’s deduction may fail to wrest a skeptic out of these personalities and moods. But it 
is extreme to see this as a flaw. Probably no argument or rhetoric can appeal to every 
uncooperative character. The deduction still offers skeptical empiricists a way out of their 
predicament, whether or not they are consistently open to it. 
5. Conclusion 
Many philosophers invoke Kant’s name and spirit when attempting ambitious refutations 
of skepticism. They model their arguments on the apparent form of the deduction, thinking this 
will imbue them with compelling force.  Perhaps this strategy can succeed. 19
But we must not let it overshadow a less aggressive, more cordial response to skepticism. 
This is to offer the skeptic a way of looking at things that she overlooks—one which illustrates 
 See (Strawson 1959, 62-63); (Putnam 1981, 16); (Korsgaard 2009, 32-33).19
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or explains the possibility of what she doubts or denies. I have argued that we can find this 
friendly sort of offer in Kant’s deduction. And I think that if we hold Kant’s offer in mind, we 
will be able to see various other responses to skepticism along roughly the same lines. This can 
offer us an easily overlooked strategy for responding to, and curing, skepticism. 
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